3.18
Reflection is guided by the ideal of intelligibility. Logic and the psychology of reasoning require a prior definition of intelligibility.
Intelligibility is necessity within a system.
There are examples of this in simple and complex systems.
The goal or ideal is implicit in all questions. In ordinary thought the goal or ideal takes various forms including logical and psychological.
3.19
Reflecting about things is not explained by physical stimuli or practical necessity. It implies a tension or conflict within the theoretic impulse itself.
Reflection springs from a fragment challenging a theory system, even though the situation producing the challenge may usually be non-theoretic.
How much reflection depends on how sensitive one is to the challenges. But that requires an appropriate starting point, a fact indicating the importance of special knowledge for reflection. This is a necessary although not sufficient condition for reflection.
Sensitivity to the challenge also requires a demand from without for readjustment. This is the condition of both social and individual development.
There must also be a normality of certain conditions of the body and the mind. Stupidity is not an issue.
3.20
To reflect with a purpose requires specifying the question, a process whose length and difficulty vary with the problem.
This specification is required by the nature of thought.
Discoveries are made by chance only in appearance.
3.21
Specification of a problem may not be enough to imply anything, in which case more data is needed.
There are three functions of observation and experiment.
Observation supplies the base for implication, even even though it is rigidly limited.
Mistakes in observation are usually due to its domination by theory, although some control by theory is inevitable.
The domination theory may make us observe the wrong things, whether by focusing on the irrelevant, by unfair stresses within the relevant, or by creating evidence out of hand.
Control by theory may also make us miss the right things by ignoring part of a whole.
And control by theory may make us miss the right things by ignoring exceptions to a rule.
What is fallacious is the inference based on non-observation, not non-observation itself, although such inference is justifiable in two types of situations.
Like thought generally, observation both assumes and seeks the universal.
Observation's distortion by feeling takes place indirectly through theory and value.
Observation conditions theory, and theory conditions observation.
This is the paradox of inventive mind.
3.22
Creation is discovery and discovery is creation.
Understanding discovery and creation implies no mastery of them.
Associationism holds that invention excludes logical insight. Similarity used in reasoning assumes rather than produces such insight. And when similarity is in control, reasoning disappears.
The theory of invention as similar association conflicts with fact and commits us to metaphysical nonsense.
The law of contiguity cannot explain invention, and neither contiguity nor invention can explain themselves either alone or in a context of other laws of association. Examples include Hume and Plato.
Invention in these cases is essentially the completion of a system.
Associationism gets no help from a law of individual differences or a law of context.
Teleology is a problem for associationism, because of its jealousy of the factual nature of psychology. But *what* facts is the psychologist concerned with? Not acts as opposed to presentations, or neutral elements as opposed to values within presentation, or elements of value taken as occurrences only.
Association must accept the working of values as values, otherwise science would caricature what thought is.
So a merely descriptive science of thinking is not possible.
And one can understand another mind only by sharing some of its goals or values.
An imperfectly realized purpose completes itself through invention from known necessities.
3.23
The factors of invention are sagacity and inference. Sagacity is more important.
But this is not fertility in similars, since such fertility must be controlled by the requirements of the system.
And in certain cases, such as calculating prodigies, there may be no fertility at all. These cases are explainable only by the working of necessity, as are other cases of categorical inference.
Necessity applies only to prior thinking, but prior thinking does not have to be so abstract.
All thinking is to some extent prior.
In some ways, thinking is not necessary, such as in non-mathematical situations, such as in _Othello_.
New suggestions must be organic with a mass of previous knowledge which controls by suppression as well as inference.
Command of analogy is an aid to invention, although not the essence of invention. It functioned in the case of Newton.
Insight and analogy presuppose each other. Insight into the relevant prescribes the limits of valid analogy, within which limits imaginative fertility subserves insight.
Through a variety of instances we may implicitly grasp the necessary. And even through this does not imply empiricism, invention requires developing an identity into a new form. There are examples in an ascending order of insight.
This kind of development implies a latent system, which ultimately means that thought is compelled by its implicit goals and values in every field of insight.
3.24
Artistic invention may be effortless, and there is testimony from Hamilton and Poincare that scientific invention is largely effortless.
Subconscious thinking is improved by conscious practice. Subconscious capital is increased by mere experience.
And apart from skill in reasoning, subconscious thinking may provide a basis for expert judgment.
Expert judgment may be somewhat mystical, but it is still just as rational. The subconscious may be made to work toward specific goals and values by maintaining a special interest.
14...
Reflection is guided by the ideal of intelligibility. Logic and the psychology of reasoning require a prior definition of intelligibility.
Intelligibility is necessity within a system.
There are examples of this in simple and complex systems.
The goal or ideal is implicit in all questions. In ordinary thought the goal or ideal takes various forms including logical and psychological.
3.19
Reflecting about things is not explained by physical stimuli or practical necessity. It implies a tension or conflict within the theoretic impulse itself.
Reflection springs from a fragment challenging a theory system, even though the situation producing the challenge may usually be non-theoretic.
How much reflection depends on how sensitive one is to the challenges. But that requires an appropriate starting point, a fact indicating the importance of special knowledge for reflection. This is a necessary although not sufficient condition for reflection.
Sensitivity to the challenge also requires a demand from without for readjustment. This is the condition of both social and individual development.
There must also be a normality of certain conditions of the body and the mind. Stupidity is not an issue.
3.20
To reflect with a purpose requires specifying the question, a process whose length and difficulty vary with the problem.
This specification is required by the nature of thought.
Discoveries are made by chance only in appearance.
3.21
Specification of a problem may not be enough to imply anything, in which case more data is needed.
There are three functions of observation and experiment.
Observation supplies the base for implication, even even though it is rigidly limited.
Mistakes in observation are usually due to its domination by theory, although some control by theory is inevitable.
The domination theory may make us observe the wrong things, whether by focusing on the irrelevant, by unfair stresses within the relevant, or by creating evidence out of hand.
Control by theory may also make us miss the right things by ignoring part of a whole.
And control by theory may make us miss the right things by ignoring exceptions to a rule.
What is fallacious is the inference based on non-observation, not non-observation itself, although such inference is justifiable in two types of situations.
Like thought generally, observation both assumes and seeks the universal.
Observation's distortion by feeling takes place indirectly through theory and value.
Observation conditions theory, and theory conditions observation.
This is the paradox of inventive mind.
3.22
Creation is discovery and discovery is creation.
Understanding discovery and creation implies no mastery of them.
Associationism holds that invention excludes logical insight. Similarity used in reasoning assumes rather than produces such insight. And when similarity is in control, reasoning disappears.
The theory of invention as similar association conflicts with fact and commits us to metaphysical nonsense.
The law of contiguity cannot explain invention, and neither contiguity nor invention can explain themselves either alone or in a context of other laws of association. Examples include Hume and Plato.
Invention in these cases is essentially the completion of a system.
Associationism gets no help from a law of individual differences or a law of context.
Teleology is a problem for associationism, because of its jealousy of the factual nature of psychology. But *what* facts is the psychologist concerned with? Not acts as opposed to presentations, or neutral elements as opposed to values within presentation, or elements of value taken as occurrences only.
Association must accept the working of values as values, otherwise science would caricature what thought is.
So a merely descriptive science of thinking is not possible.
And one can understand another mind only by sharing some of its goals or values.
An imperfectly realized purpose completes itself through invention from known necessities.
3.23
The factors of invention are sagacity and inference. Sagacity is more important.
But this is not fertility in similars, since such fertility must be controlled by the requirements of the system.
And in certain cases, such as calculating prodigies, there may be no fertility at all. These cases are explainable only by the working of necessity, as are other cases of categorical inference.
Necessity applies only to prior thinking, but prior thinking does not have to be so abstract.
All thinking is to some extent prior.
In some ways, thinking is not necessary, such as in non-mathematical situations, such as in _Othello_.
New suggestions must be organic with a mass of previous knowledge which controls by suppression as well as inference.
Command of analogy is an aid to invention, although not the essence of invention. It functioned in the case of Newton.
Insight and analogy presuppose each other. Insight into the relevant prescribes the limits of valid analogy, within which limits imaginative fertility subserves insight.
Through a variety of instances we may implicitly grasp the necessary. And even through this does not imply empiricism, invention requires developing an identity into a new form. There are examples in an ascending order of insight.
This kind of development implies a latent system, which ultimately means that thought is compelled by its implicit goals and values in every field of insight.
3.24
Artistic invention may be effortless, and there is testimony from Hamilton and Poincare that scientific invention is largely effortless.
Subconscious thinking is improved by conscious practice. Subconscious capital is increased by mere experience.
And apart from skill in reasoning, subconscious thinking may provide a basis for expert judgment.
Expert judgment may be somewhat mystical, but it is still just as rational. The subconscious may be made to work toward specific goals and values by maintaining a special interest.
14...
